Technical analysis of Hyperliquid hot events from the perspective of blockchain security
The main reason why Hyperliquid was widely discussed by the community today was the potential security risks in its bridge contract - USD 2.3 billion of USDC assets relied on a 3/4 multi-signature mechanism among 4 validators for protection, and there were also multiple known North Korean hacker addresses that were active in its platform recently. This led to some panic selling in the community, with the highest drop of more than 25% on the day, the highest market value evaporation of more than 7 billion US dollars, and more than 150 million US dollars of ecological funds on the chain fleeing.
This kind of conflict at the technical and ecological levels is very typical in the current DeFi security.
Below, we will conduct an in-depth analysis from three aspects: the risks of the validator mechanism , the behavior patterns of North Korean hackers , and potential mitigation measures :
1. The core problem of the validator mechanism: over-centralized design and potential attack scenarios
Currently, there are only 4 validators for the Hyperliquid bridge contract, which is an extreme multi-signature architecture in DeFi projects. USDC assets worth $2.3 billion rely on the rule agreed by 3/4 validators . This design exposes two obvious risks:
(1) The validator is hacked
Attack Result Once the hacker controls 3 validators, they can sign malicious transactions and transfer $2.3 billion USDC to the attacker's address. This risk is extremely serious and almost impossible to intercept through conventional firewalls. Unless the transaction is rolled back from the Arbitrum cross-chain assets, then all decentralization will be lost.
Technical Intrusion Paths The North Korean hacker team has the top attack capabilities in the encryption industry. Its classic intrusion paths include:
Social engineering attacks : Send phishing emails with malicious links by pretending to be a partner or trusted entity to implant RAT (Remote Access Trojan).
Supply chain attacks : If a validator device relies on unsigned binaries or third-party components, hackers can gain control by inserting malicious update packages.
Zero-day vulnerability attacks : Exploit zero-day vulnerabilities in Chrome or other commonly used software to execute malicious code directly on the validator device.
(2) The credibility and distribution of validators
The current Hyperliquid validator architecture appears to have the following weaknesses:
Are validators running the same code? Is there a decentralized build and run environment?
Is there a physical concentration of validators? If validator nodes in the same area are physically attacked or disconnected from the network, it may be easier for attackers to attack the remaining nodes.
Is the security of the authenticator's personal device managed by a unified enterprise? If the authenticator uses a personal device to access critical systems and does not deploy security monitoring measures such as EDR (endpoint detection and response), the attack surface will be further enlarged.
2. North Korean hacker attack methods: from traces to potential threats
The hacker behavior pattern disclosed by the famous overseas blogger Tay deserves high vigilance. The logic behind it suggests a systematic attack strategy:
(1) Why do hackers choose Hyperliquid?
High-value target : $2.3 billion in USDC is enough to attract any top hacker team, and assets of this size provide sufficient motivation for attack.
The validator mechanism is too weak : it only takes three validators to control all assets. This low-threshold attack path is very attractive.
Trading activities as a means of testing : Hackers test system stability by executing transactions, possibly to collect behavioral patterns of the Hyperliquid system, such as transaction processing delays, anomaly detection mechanisms, etc., to provide data support for the next attack.
(2) Expected path of attack
The hacker would likely take the following steps:
Collect the identity information and social activities of the verifier and send targeted phishing emails or messages.
Implant RAT on the verifier's device and gain control of the device through remote access.
Analyze Hyperliquid's transaction logic and submit a fund withdrawal request through a forged transaction signature.
Finally, the funds transfer is executed and USDC is sent to the mixing services on multiple chains for laundering.
(3) Expansion of attack targets
Although Hyperliquid's assets have not been stolen yet, the active transaction traces of hackers indicate that they are conducting "lurking" or "exploratory attacks." The community should not ignore these warnings, as they are often an important preparation stage before hacker teams execute attacks.
3. Currently feasible mitigation measures: How to prevent attacks from landing?
To address this risk, Hyperliquid needs to implement the following improvements as soon as possible:
(1) Decentralized validator architecture
Increase the number of validators : From the current 4 validators to 15-20, which can significantly increase the difficulty for hackers to break into the majority of validators at the same time.
Adopt a distributed operating environment : Ensure that validator nodes are distributed in multiple regions around the world, and that the physical and network environments are isolated from each other.
Introducing different code implementations : To avoid single points of failure, the validator's running code can use different implementations (such as dual versions of Rust and Go).
(2) Improving the security of the verifier’s equipment
Dedicated device management : All critical operations of the verifier must be completed on dedicated devices managed by Hyperliquid and a complete EDR system must be deployed for monitoring.
Disable unsigned binaries : All files running on the verifier device must be verified by Hyperliquid's unified signature to prevent supply chain attacks.
Regular security training : Provide education and training to authenticators on social engineering attacks to improve their ability to identify phishing emails and malicious links.
(3) Protection mechanism at the bridging contract level
Delayed transaction mechanism : A delayed execution mechanism is set up for large-scale fund withdrawals (such as more than 10 million US dollars) to provide the community and team with response time.
Dynamic verification threshold : Adjust the number of validators required based on the withdrawal amount, for example, when the amount exceeds a certain amount, 90% of the validators’ signatures are required.
(4) Improving attack detection and response capabilities
Blacklist mechanism : Cooperate with Circle to directly reject transaction requests marked as malicious addresses.
On-chain activity monitoring : Real-time monitoring of all abnormal activities on Hyperliquid, such as sudden increase in the frequency of large transactions, abnormal validator signature behavior, etc.
Summarize
The problem exposed by Hyperliquid today is not an isolated case, but a systemic hidden danger that is prevalent in the current DeFi ecosystem: the level of attention paid to the validator mechanism and off-chain security is far lower than that at the contract level .
There has been no actual attack yet, but this incident is a strong warning. Hyperliquid not only needs to quickly strengthen the decentralization and security of validators at the technical level, but also needs to promote comprehensive discussion and improvement of the risks of bridge contracts in the community. Otherwise, these potential risks may be truly exploited in the future, causing irreversible losses.
